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Abstract: 
This paper sets out to analyse the determinants of Italian SMEs’ choices of 
sources of finance, with specific reference to the role of informed (internal) 
capital compared to other forms of finance. In this work, we aim to identify 
the determinants of the mix of sources of finance using data from the 
Survey of Italian Firms conducted by Capitalia, bearing in mind the 
structural characteristics of the firms and the banking market, and the 
problems of the information asymmetry between the bank and the firm. 
Although the financial hierarchy theory suggests that firms prefer self-
financing, because it is less expensive in economic terms, relationships with 
local banks may offer advantages which encourage firms to enter into debt 
contracts even in the absence of binding internal constraints. The empirical 
study focused in particular on the role of self-financing as an alternative to 
external sources.  In order to measure the decision to use self-financing and 
the subsequent composition of the financing mix, we used different 
techniques, first independent models and then a self-selection model. The 
first results, in line with the pecking order theory, confirm an approach 
comprising an initial check on the availability of internal resources, 
followed if by the use of external capital, including bank debt.  
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“[…] it is well known that in the 
analysis of business cases, two or more 
solutions usually appear equally 
defensible. Those who hold to the 
skeptical position therefore assert that 
there can be no science of business 
finance since experts cannot arrive at 
unique answers”. 
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∗ University of Bologna; Department of Management and CREDIF Via Capo di Lucca, 34, 40126 
Bologna. E.mail: paola.brighi@unibo.it and giuseppe.torluccio@unibo.it. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
This paper sets out to analyse the determinants of Italian SMEs’ choices of 
sources of finance, with specific reference to the role of informed (internal) 
capital compared to other forms of finance. The pecking order theory 
(Myers, 1984 and Myers-Majluf, 1984) suggests that firms prefer internal to 
external finance, and that there is a preference for debt over equity when it 
comes to external sources.  
The literature on financial intermediation (from Leland and Pyle, 1977 
onwards), offers interesting pointers as to the determinants of SMEs’ 
financial structure, and thus also on the breakdown of the sources of 
investment financing. 
However, from both theoretical and empirical points of view, the question 
of the motivations underlying the choice of mix of sources of finance is still 
widely debated, with no conclusive solution yet in sight (Frank and Goyal, 
2005). The use of debt as a source of finance implies an increase in the 
firm’s costs and may lead to a greater risk of bankruptcy indipendently from 
fiscal benefits. The literature on financial intermediation has generally 
focused on the debt contract, which has often been considered as the optimal 
method of financing (Leland and Pyle, 1977 and Diamond, 1984). However, 
as de Meza and Webb (1987) have shown, a number of distorting 
phenomena such as credit rationing may simply disappear if equity is 
accepted as an alternative source of finance1. Although clear in 
methodological terms, de Meza and Webb’s finding (1987) has not 
concluded the debate on the problems concerning a firm’s financial 
decisions in conditions of uncertainty. 
In fact, the literature contains contradictory findings. On the one hand, some 
authors assert that high risk firms (defined as small, innovative firms with 
high information opacity) prefer debt contracts to equity contracts 
(Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). On the other hand, various authors argue that 
the firm’s propensity to choose equity increases in direct proportion to the 
risk associated to the project they wish to finance. However, whether the 
resulting equity financing is the outcome of a voluntary ex-ante decision on 
the part of the entrepreneur (Ueda, 2003 and Landier, 2002) or the 
consequence of credit rationing by the bank (Bolton and Freixas, 2000) is 
still a matter requiring further investigation2. While on the one hand, credit 
rationing limits the firm’s external finance options, on the other, the firm’s 
opportunity to signal its quality through its collateral may restore the debt 
                                                 
1 de Meza e Webb, 1987, pp. 281-282 write “The structure of information also has implications for the 
method of finance. Entrepreneurs with projects that are attractive to banks attempt to choose financial 
structures that signal their characteristics. We are able to show that the assumptions which yield the 
overinvestment result support debt as the equilibrium method of finance. Interestingly, however, under 
the Stiglitz-Weiss assumptions, equity rather than debt is shown to be the equilibrium method of 
finance”. 
2 With reference to young, strongly innovation-oriented German SMEs Schäfer et al. (2004) demonstrate 
the truth of the hypothesis that “Investments with a high intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be 
equity than debt-financed. Investments with a low intrinsic and financial risk are more likely to be debt 
than equity financed” (p. 5). 
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equilibrium3. In other words, the availability of collateral reduces the 
creditor’s financial risk. Bester (1985) considers endogenous collateral as a 
signalling tool for good quality firms in a self-selection model.  
The literature on the optimal mix of the firm’s sources of finance also leaves 
scope for further study from the empirical point of view. Frank and Goyal 
(2005) study the importance of questionnaires as a tool for empirical survey 
of the firm’s capital structure, and state that although the literature produced 
is of some interest, at present it is unable to deliver conclusive results. 
In this work, we aim to contribute to this discussion by identifying the 
determinants of the mix of sources of finance with the aid of the data from 
the Survey of Italian Firms conducted by Capitalia, bearing in mind the 
structural characteristics of the firms and the banking market, and the 
problems of the information asymmetry between the bank and the firm. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section summarises the 
theoretical framework of reference, underlining the effects of the firm’s 
financial structure from the point of view of both the firm itself (point 2.1) 
and the bank (point 2.2). After a description of the sample used (point 3), 
the following sections describe the methodological approach adopted for the 
econometric analysis (point 4). In particular, we study the determinants of 
the firm’s mix of sources of finance in relation to the firm’s own structural 
characteristics, the structure of the banking market and the information 
asymmetries (point  4.1). Then to understand the firm’s financial decisions 
we adopt a two-stage approach using the self-selection model proposed by 
Heckman (point 4.2). The conclusion summarises the main findings and 
offers a number of suggestions for future research (point 5). 
 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
How do firms finance themselves? How should they finance their 
investments? What are the factors which influence the firm’s financing 
decisions, and the decisions of SMEs in particular? The economic theories 
we will be surveying attempt to answer these questions, first from the firm’s 
and then from the bank’s point of view. 
 
Traditionally, the firm’s market value and real decisions were considered to 
be unaffected by its financial structure and financing policies, since in the 
theoretical context generated by Modigliani and Miller’s theorem (1958), 
capital markets were perfect, fiscal neutrality reigned and, therefore, 
external funds (shares, bonds and debt) and internal funds (self-financing) 
were perfect substitutes for each other. This led to an approach to 
investment theory in which the firm’s problem of intertemporal optimisation 
is solved without reference to financial factors, or including them on the 
basis of assumptions valid in a context of perfect capital markets. Given the 
hypothesis that all firms have the same access to the capital and information 
markets and the cost of capital is exogenous, in traditional models the 
dominant notion is of the “representative firm”. But the idea that the same 
                                                 
3 Obviously, as Schafer et al. note, 2004, p. 5 “for high-risk entrepreneurs lacking collateral, this route of 
returning to the preferred loan market is not open and equity may appear as the only remaining option”. 
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model can be applied to all firms proved incapable of explaining 
investments’ sensitivity to the financial variables which differ between 
large, medium and small enterprises4. This implies that although the 
theoretical principles underlying the theory of capital structure may be valid 
for all firms, there are however institutional or regulatory conditions, or 
simply operating practices, which lead SMEs to make financial choices 
different from those of large firms. 
After the pioneer work by Modigliani and Miller the theory on capital 
structure develops following two alternative theoretical approaches: the 
trade-off theory (from now on, TOT) and the pecking-order theory (from 
now on, POT). 
 
2.1.1 The trade-off theory 
According to this theory, there is an optimal indebtedness ratio which 
depends on the trade-off between the debt’s costs and benefits5. There are 
two main categories of costs discussed in the literature: bankruptcy costs 
and agency costs. Bankruptcy costs depend on the firm’s risk of bankruptcy. 
Unlike the use of its private capital, the use of debt as a mean of financing 
investments forces the firm to meet fixed obligations in relation to its 
financers-creditors with regard to the payment of interest and the 
reimbursement of the capital lent.  The risk of bankruptcy, which the firm 
runs if its cash flow situation should become critical to an extent which 
jeopardises its compliance with the financial commitments undertaken, 
generates costs known as bankruptcy costs. When assessing the impact of 
these costs on the financial structure, it must be remembered that the 
likelihood that they will occur is directly proportional to the degree of 
indebtedness of the firm’s financial structure itself. In other words, the 
probability of financial difficulties which, if unresolved, may lead to the 
firm bankruptcy, is directly proportional to the level of indebtedness.  While 
on the one hand, debt creates costs for the firm relating to the bankruptcy 
risk, on the other hand it provides benefits deriving from the associated tax 
shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). According to the TOT, the trade-off 
between the bankruptcy costs and the fiscal benefits deriving from the debt 
defines the optimal financial structure for the firm.  Empirical evidence 
(Warner, 1977, Altman, 1984 and Graham and Harvey, 2001) tends to 
confirm the worth of this theoretical approach, highlighting the fact that the 
firm’s decisions in terms of financial structure are based on a comparative 
analysis of the bankruptcy costs and the benefits in terms of tax savings 
arising from the use of debt, especially in the case of medium and large-
sized firms. 
 
                                                 
4 It has been empirically proven (Fazzari et al., 1988) that the degree of sensitivity to the different forms 
of financing varies depending on the size of the firm and dividend policies, as well as the duration of the 
relationship with a specific bank. 
5 It should be remembered that for the purposes of TOT, one benefit considered is that of the tax-
deductibility of interest costs. Since this aspect is outside the focus of our study, for more in-depth 
consideration see the original by Modigliani and Miller, 1963 and then to DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980. 
For the Italian case see for example Bontempi et al. 2004. 
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With regard to the validity of the TOT’s conclusions, it should be noted that 
as the firm’s level of risk increases, so does the underlying bankruptcy cost, 
with a negative effect on leverage. Since bankruptcy costs are higher in the 
case of firms with large amounts of intangible assets, such enterprises are 
considered riskier and have a lower level of indebtedness than firms with 
larger amounts of tangible fixed assets. Under this principle, as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest, firms with high growth potential – which 
typically feature large investments in R&D – should have proportionally 
less debt than firms in more older sectors6. This hypothesis is also supported 
by the empirical findings relating to Italy: the more mature and traditional 
sectors are considered safer by creditors (since they have a higher level of 
fixed assets in relation to investments in R&D and other intangibles), and all 
other effects being equal, their degree of indebtedness is, in fact, above 
average (see Bontempi and Golinelli, 1996 – 
p. 60)7. 
 
Hyp. 1 – The TOT explains the existence of a negative relation between 
leverage and intangible assets. 
 
Similarly, it has been shown that smaller-sized firms are riskier than large 
ones, so there should be a positive relation between indebtedness and firm 
size (Ang et al., 1982)8. 
 
Hyp. 2 – The TOT explains the existence of a positive relation between 
leverage and size. 
 
Another aspect of the interdependency between the conclusions to which 
the TOT leads and the firm’s characteristics relates to the firm’s 
profitability. According to the TOT, it would appear that firms with better 
earnings performances are at an advantage when it comes to the use of debt, 
since on the one hand they are able to guarantee that the debt will be 
serviced regularly, and on the other they have greater interest in exploiting 
the tax benefits involved.  However, the empirical evidence points in the 
opposite direction: highly profitable firms tend to have a low level of 
indebtedness (see, amongst others, Myers, 1998). 
 
Hyp. 3 – The TOT explains the existence of a positive relation between 
leverage and profitability. 
 
As well as bankruptcy costs, there are also other costs which may influence 
the use of debt in the firm’s capital structure: agency costs. These costs 
                                                 
6 On this point see, amongst others, also Myers, 1977, Hutchinson and Ray, 1986, and Harris and Raviv, 
1990. 
7 However, it should be noted that the empirical evidence on this point is contradictory. For example, 
Michelas et al., 1999, studying SMEs in the UK, demonstrate a positive relationship between the firm’s 
growth opportunities and indebtedness.  
8 The empirical evidence is also contradictory with regard to this parameter. Banking theoretical models 
suggest, for example, that as the firm’s size and age increase, it tends to make greater use of differentiated 
modes of financing (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
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derive from the conflict of interest between the firm’s shareholders, 
management and financers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) focus their 
attention on two separate types of conflict of interest: those concerning the 
relationships between the firm’s owners and financers on the one hand, and 
those concerning the relationship between the firm’s owners and 
management on the other. 
On the one hand, shareholders have an interest in realising riskier 
investment projects because they have a higher expected return than that 
agreed with the external financers. If the investment is a success, the firm 
takes the surplus; otherwise, the costs are offloaded onto the financers. This 
information asymmetry increases the cost of indebtedness, and renders it 
more expensive than internal finance. As a consequence, firms with high 
agency costs due to conflicts of interest between owners and financers – 
debt agency costs –  should have a lower level of debt financing.  
 
Hyp. 4a – The TOT explains the existence of a negative relation between 
debt agency costs and leverage. 
 
On the other hand, the management may undertake corporate projects which 
do not maximise the owners’ interest, for the sole purpose of personal gain.  
In order to prevent opportunistic behaviour of this kind, the owners have to 
meet costs – capital agency costs – which, unlike debt agency costs, are 
inversely proportional to the degree of leverage since the obligation to 
refund capital and pay interest limits the degree of discretion enjoyed by the 
company’s management in its use of the firm’s financial resources. 
 
Hyp. 4b – The TOT explains the existence of a positive relation between 
capital agency costs and leverage. 
 
Therefore, according to the TOT, if we consider the benefits of the use of 
debt with regard to conflicts of interest between ownership and managers on 
the one hand, and the higher debt agency costs deriving from high levels of 
indebtedness on the other, the optimal financial structure will be the one 
which provides a mix of sources of finance which balances these two 
phenomena.  
 
Hyp. 4c – According to the TOT, the optimal mix of sources of finance – 
debt and equity – is the  outcome of a problem of minimising total agency 
costs.  
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2.1.2 The pecking-order-theory 
 
According to the second theoretical approach – POT – it is the presence of 
the information asymmetries described between owners and financers that 
implies the existence of a financial hierarchy amongst the sources of finance 
used by firms. Firms prefer internal sources of finance, or self-financing, 
and their favourite source of external finance is debt9. This apparently also 
explains why highly profitable companies tend to have low levels of 
leverage. This financial hierarchy applies in particular to SMEs, which 
make only limited use of the equity market, even when their legal form 
allows them to exploit it, because this form of finance is more expensive in 
terms of information disclosure10. 
 
Hyp. 5 – According to the POT, there is a negative relation between the 
degree of leverage (debt over informed equity) and the level of information 
asymmetry. 
 
Moreover, the POT also explains why, in contrast with what the TOT 
predicts, highly profitable companies tend to have low levels of leverage. 
This is due to the fact that firms which are not particularly profitable have 
fewer internal funds for new investment projects, meaning that they are 
forced to use external finance amongst which the firm prefers debt instead 
of equity. 
 
Hyp. 6 – According to the POT, there is a negative relation between the 
degree of leverage and the firm’s level of profitability. 
 
Corollary 1 – According to the POT, there is a negative relation between 
the degree of leverage and the firm’s level of liquidity. 
 
A simple graph may help us to better understand the problem of the 
sequential choice of sources of finance11. Given the total amount of the 
investment to be financed (demand for funds, D) and considering the costs 
associated to the information asymmetries (which define the supply of funds 
SF), the firm will first use self-financing, then debt and as last resort the 
issue of shares. Let us consider three possible investment projects to be 
financed, D1, D2 and D3. If SF refers to the supply of funds and the 
investment demand is D1 the firm will be able to finance the investment 
                                                 
9 The severity of the information asymmetry implies costs which gradually rise in the transition from self-
financing to banking debt and then equity. 
10 The owners of SMEs are generally unwilling to share control of their firms with third parties due to the 
fear of losing independence, control and flexibility in the management of their businesses. From this 
point of view, a debt contract is obviously preferable to an equity contract. In the case of a debt contract, 
the only risk of losing ownership control of the firm is in extreme cases of bankruptcy, although in many 
cases banks prefer to renew loans before forcing the firm into bankruptcy. For more in-depth discussion 
see, for example, Holmes and Kent, 1991, Hamilton and Fox, 1998 and Sogorb-Mira, 2005. An analysis 
of corporate governance and the control of firms in Italy is provided by Bianco and Casavola, 1999. 
11 The analysis which follows is adapted from the work of Fazzari et al., 1988 and Hall, 2002, to which 
readers should refer for more details. 
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project entirely with internal funds, and is thus not subject to severe 
financial constraints.  However, if the demand is D2 or D3, the firm will be 
forced to use external sources, debt and the issue of shares, incurring a cost 
higher than that of self-financing12. The incidence of this cost, which 
depends on the severity of the information asymmetries between bank and 
firm and whether or not the firm has access to the banking or capital market, 
varies from firm to firm, and thus affects investment decisions (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Investments, Source of Finance and Rationing 
Source: adapted from Fazzari et al. 1988 and Hall, 2002. 
 
So far, we have considered that the sources of finance used for investment 
projects depend only on the firm’s demand. However, the very market 
frictions – information asymmetries – which make capital structure choices 
significant also imply that firms are sometimes rationed by their financers. 
Therefore, when evaluating decisions concerning sources of finance it is 
important to include not only the determinants of the demand, but also the 
parameters which measure the constraints on the supply side (see 
Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). This becomes particularly important when 
examining the criteria which guide the choice between the use of equity and 
debt when external sources of finance have to be used. In the case of equity 
market over-evaluation, a firm can take advantage from equity issue. 
Relatively higher-risk investment projects increase this sort of advantage. 
However, investors pay attention to management equity issuance and 
underwrite new equity issues if - and only if - the firm has exhausted debt 
                                                 
12 In cases D2 and D3, the project is financed by a mix of sources of finance. In the first case the mix 
consists of self-financing and debt, and in the second of self-financing, debt and equity. 
Self-financing 
D1 
D2 
D3 
Supply of funds, SF 
Investment 
SF1 SF2 
New equity New debt 
Mix 
Cost of self-
financing 
Cost of equity 
Cost of debt 
 8 
financing sources.  Thus the investors’ attitude forces the firm to adopt a 
hierarchical strategy in relation to its financial decisions, with self-financing 
preferred to external resources, and debt viewed more favourably than share 
issues. 
 
Thus there are two factors which play a crucial role in the choice to use 
external finance: the level of information asymmetry between the firm and 
the financial market, and the firm’s risk level. Once the hierarchical order of 
external sources of finance has been decided, with debt preferred to equity, 
it seems logical to expect that as the firm’s level of risk rises, it will become 
more likely to use the sources of finance at the end of the list.  In fact, a 
high risk rating tends to make the use of debt so expensive that share issues 
become the preferable option. Each firm has its own debt capacity, strictly 
dependent on its risk level. Financial decisions also depend on the degree of 
information asymmetry. Assuming that a firm has a given risk level, the 
more difficulty the market has in establishing the real value of the firm itself 
and its investment projects, the greater the preference for less high-risk 
sources of finance, and self-financing above all. 
 
Corollary 2 – According to the POT leverage (debt over informed equity) 
is negatively related to the risk level. 
 
2.2 Information Asymmetries, Relationship Banking and SMEs  
Like the market, the banking system also assesses a firm’s risk rating, which 
helps to set the risk premium it will be required to pay. However, the 
presence of adverse selection problems still implies that it is not always 
possible to “offload” the cost of the information asymmetry onto the cost of 
the finance (interest rate). In these cases, the bank’s screening activity may 
lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 13,14 and if the company 
wishes to conclude its investment project it will be forced to issue shares, or 
to use self-financing if the market rations its credit because it is considered 
too risky. 
While on the one hand the presence of information asymmetries justifies the 
existence of the banking intermediaries which provide loans even to firms 
affected by information opacity, on the other hand the screening and 
monitoring activities15 used to assess the firm to be financed expose it to the 
rationing risk.  
 
Hyp. 7 – The relation between leverage and information opacity is doubtful. 
                                                 
13 Credit rationing is defined as “type I” when some or all clients receive an amount of credit below what 
they requested at the prevalent interest rate (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). “Type II” rationing occurs when 
banks refuse credit to some clients while granting it to others identical in all respects to those rationed 
(Keeton, 1979 and Stiglitz-Weiss, 1981). 
14 Credit rationing can be illustrated in graph form by shifting the debt supply curve upward (see line in 
bold type in Fig. 1). Thus if the demand were D2 and D3, the financial constraints would become more 
binding. 
15 In this paper, we concentrate only on the problems related to screening of the firm and/or project to 
be financed. For a more detailed discussion of monitoring, see, amongst others, Gorton and Winton 
(2003). For an application to the firm’s financial structure see, for example, Kristiansen (2006). 
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The problems linked to the screening stage derive first of all from the 
difficulty experienced by subjects outside the company in assessing the 
profitability of the project financed, as well as the risk of moral hazard 
during the transmission of the information between the various subjects, 
with the risk of overestimating good-quality characteristics. In particular, 
potential investors have difficulty in distinguishing between a “good” 
quality company which wishes to share the risk of a “good” investment 
project with third parties (bank or market), and a “poor” quality company 
which wishes to offload the risk of its investment project onto third parties 
(Akerlof, 1970). The emission of signals by “good” quality firms is one way 
of overcoming the problem of selection. Signalling involves costs that can 
be profitably sustained only by  “good” quality firms; doing so enables them 
to drive the “poor” quality firms off the market and make their investment 
projects tempting to external investors.  Signals involve a form of self-
selection on the part of the good-quality supplier. In other words, good-
quality firms must undertake an action involving the investment of their 
private capital in the business they wish to finance, which provides the 
buyer with a clear indication of the quality of the product on offer, and 
which is also too expensive to be imitated by the poor-quality producer 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
 
Hyp. 8 – Leverage is positively to the firm’s level of equity (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). 
 
Ross (1977), on the other hand, demonstrates that in a context in which 
bankruptcy is expensive, leverage can be used as a tool for signalling that 
the firm is of good quality16. 
 
Hyp. 9 – A firm’s quality is directly proportional to its leverage (Ross, 
1977).  
 
 Another tool used as a signal for reducing information asymmetries and the 
risk of rationing is collateral. Bester (1985) demonstrates that in a situation 
of equilibrium there is no rationing if banks compete by setting both the 
level of collateral and the interest rate. The firm’s choice of one contract 
rather than another acts as a self-selection mechanism on its part. For 
example, in exchange for a cut in the interest rate, firms with a low 
bankruptcy risk are prepared to accept higher collateral than firms with a 
higher risk 17,18. 
 
Hyp. 10 – Leverage is in positively related to collateral (Bester, 1985). 
 
                                                 
16 Ross, 1977, p. 23 writes “the values of firms will rise with leverage, since, increasing leverage increases 
the market’s perception of value”. 
17 In contrast with the prevailing literature on collateral, Berger and Udell, 1990 demonstrate that 
collateral is often associated to higher-risk debtors, higher-risk loans and higher-risk banks. 
18 For a more detailed discussion of signalling theory, see Tirole, 2006, chap. 6.  
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Once the problem of selecting the project to be financed has been overcome, 
it becomes necessary to monitor the entrepreneur’s behaviour, in order to 
ensure that his actions and the use of the funds obtained are in line with the 
stated objective, and no moral hazards (ex-post information asymmetries) 
arise.  This problem can be overcome through: i) the imposition of 
covenants; ii) the provision of incentives which encourage the agent to 
behave in the principal’s interests; iii) last but not least, verification that the 
project’s economic returns and any profits are distributed in accordance 
with the ex-ante contract agreements. 
In general, the literature on information asymmetries  suggests that if the 
benefits (in terms of the increase in the information produced) deriving from 
the economies of scale achieved by an intermediary during screening and 
monitoring operations exceed the costs firms would have to incur to 
persuade investors to finance them and the costs the investors would have to 
incur to monitor the firms (Diamond, 1984), it will be economically more 
beneficial to borrow from the bank than from the market. This reasoning is 
further reinforced in the case of SMEs, for which the costs of information 
asymmetries are definitely higher than for large firms. 
However, the opportunity for a bank  to establish continuous, repeated 
relationships (relationship lending) generates a mass of exclusive 
information which allows it to overcome the problems linked to the severity 
of the information asymmetries, especially with regard to the smallest firms. 
Relationship lending provides banks with continuos and stable private 
information. Through repeated interaction with the firm, the bank 
accumulates soft information which reduces the information asymmetry. 
There are many theoretical studies19 revealing the superiority of this kind of 
relationship over the more fragmentary, transaction-based type. In the latter, 
the bank-firm relationship is limited to a single operation, the risk-return 
evaluation of which is based only on accounting data and information 
available in the public domain (hard information)20. 
Naturally, these advantages are further reinforced if the bank is local, with 
branches in the area in which the borrower firm operates. Naturally, 
branches in the local community generate undeniable advantages during 
both screening and monitoring. Greater customers’ knowledge, better 
management of information flows during lending relationships, and more 
power to control credit risk through the implementation of local sanctions 
against debtors which are only feasible within a local community, all these 
factors imply a reduction in SME screening and monitoring costs. 
 
Hyp. 11 – Leverage is in positively related to the duration of relationship 
lending and the bank’s local branches. 
 
This preliminary survey of the theory reveals that, although the financial 
hierarchy theory suggests that firms prefer self-financing because it is less 
                                                 
19 See, amongst others, Berger and Udell, 2002 and DeYoung et al., 2004. 
20 Although relationship lending is a mechanism allowing a reduction in the information asymmetries 
between bank and SME, this does not mean that SMEs may not also benefit from transaction lending. As 
Berger and Udell (2002) underline, large, non-local banks offer transaction-lending technologies also 
suitable for use by SMEs (leasing agreements, mortgages, etc.). 
 11 
expensive in information and economic terms, relationships with local 
banks may offer advantages which encourage firms to enter into debt 
contracts even in the absence of binding internal constraints21. 
 
The main results discussed in this section can be summarized as shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Trade-Off Theory versus Pecking-Order Theory 
TOT POT
SIZE + -
AGE + -
HI-TECH - +
CASH FLOW + -
PROFITABILITY + -
INTANGIBLE ASSETS - +
TANGIBLE ASSETS + -
AGENCY COSTS +/-
                                     DEBT AGENCY COSTS - -
                                     CAPITAL AGENCY COSTS +
BANKRUPTCY COSTS -
                                    INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES +
                                    RATIONING ?
                                    COLLATERAL ?
                                    LEVERAGE ?
                                    LOCAL BANK +
                                    DURATION +
Proxy
Expected sign on Leverage
 
Source: adapted from Bontempi (2002), Di Majo et al. (2005) and Huang e 
Song (2006). 
 
3. Description of the Sample 
The database used for this study is the Survey of Italian Firms conducted by 
the SME Observatory run by the Capitalia Research Division. The survey is 
one of the main sources of information on the Italian business system, and is 
based on data obtained through the submission of questionnaires to firms.  
The survey is carried out on a sample basis for firms employing from 11 to 
500 employees, and becomes a full census for firms with more than 500. The 
accounting data source was then integrated with the AIDA - van Dijk Bureau 
database, which completes the financial statement data for Italian firms 
considered in the Survey and provides greater historic depth in the 
accounting data used. 
The database consists of qualitative and quantitative data on 4,289 firms, of 
which 3,801 employ fewer than 250 employees and 3,385 declared that they 
had made investments during  2001-2003; this last group makes up the 
database for our survey. The most significant information for our purposes 
refers to the sections of the questionnaire22 focusing on investments and 
                                                 
21 Naturally, there may also be intermediate solutions in which the firm opts for a mix of sources of 
finance: self-financing, debt and, in some cases, equity. For more discussion of this point see, amongst 
others, Repullo and Suarez, 1998 and Bolton and Freixas, 2000. 
22 It should be remembered that we are dealing with a questionnaire, and so the data provided are 
affected by the compiler’s convictions as to how the reported event should be defined. 
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sources of finance23,24. These sections ask the firm interviewed to provide a 
percentage breakdown of the use of the different financing channels25 used 
to finance investments26. 
The aim of our study is to analyse both the decision to use self-financing as 
an alternative to external sources of finance to cover investment expenditure, 
and the level of use of self-financing if it is not the only source of finance 
used (mix of sources of finance).  The empirical study, therefore, 
concentrates on the determinants of the decision to use self-financing, and 
once this decision has been taken, on the extent to which this tool is used (as 
a complementary or exclusive source). The explanatory variables (see Tab. 
5) used here relate: i) to the firm’s structural characteristics (age, size, etc.); 
ii) to the size of the information asymmetries; iii) to the structure of the 
credit market and its relationship with the firm. 
In order to identify the dependent variables used in this study (see Tab. 5), 
we first of all used the information on self-financing obtained from the 
Capitalia Survey questionnaire27. We also reprocessed these data by 
combining them with quantitative information obtained from AIDA. 
Specifically, the dependent variables are: Selffin_A which assumes the value 
1 if self-financing is greater than zero and is otherwise 0, Selffin_B which 
assumes the value of 1 if self-financing is greater than 50% and is otherwise 
0, and Selffin_C which assumes the value of 1 only if self-financing is equal 
to 100% and is otherwise 0.  
The questionnaire also allows exact definition of the percentage of self-
financing used to finance the investments, Selffin_%. Multiplying this value 
by the total investments for 2001-2003 produces the variable Selffin_lev 
which expresses the value in Euros of the investments self-financing during 
the period surveyed. Finally, we calculated the variable Selffin_Rate i.e. the 
ratio of Selffin_lev to total assets. 
The statistics describing the relative distribution of the proportion of self-
financing of investments (Selffin_% and Selffin_lev) show a strong 
concentration on the extreme values, suggesting a tendency to self-selection 
processes with regard to the decision as to whether or not to use self-
                                                 
23 Section C – “Investment, Technological Innovation and Research and Development”. In particular, 
Question C1.5: “How were the investments made during 2001-2003 financed?” (see Capitalia, 2005). 
24 The possible choices refer to the use of private capital and self-financing. The level of use of private 
capital as a method of financing appears to be negligible, while leasing, and above all bank debt, are a 
significant alternative to self-financing. 
25 Therefore, the reply does not define the structure of the total sources of finance used by the firm over 
time, which can presumably be obtained as stock figures in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities, but 
rather gives the breakdown of the sources of finance used within the period considered to support the 
investments made. Moreover, it must be noted that an analysis of the variations in the debt ratio over a 
given period does not allow a separate analysis of the loan and repayment operations, since the variation 
provides the overall balance of these operations. Use of the question included in the questionnaire has 
the advantage that it is unaffected by any repayment operations during the period, which on the other 
hand might have an impact on the debt ratio. When it comes to representing decisions, the questionnaire 
is more sensitive than the book figures available in the Statement of Asset and Liabilities to the firm’s 
own perception of the event described.  On the one hand, this may lead to distortion due to the survey 
technique, but on the other it places more emphasis on the behavioural aspect with regard to the 
entrepreneur’s choice of sources of finance. See Li and Prabhala, 2006. 
26 Note that the Investments heading on which our subsequent analysis will focus includes all tangible 
and intangible investments except for expenditure on R&D. For  a study on the diversification of sources 
of financing for R&D expenditure, see Brighi and Torluccio, 2006. 
27 See section C1.5, see Capitalia, 2005. 
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financing. The sample shows a strong imbalance in the direction of small 
firms (see Tab. 1). 50% (75%) of firms have total assets of less than 8.8 
(18.7) million Euros and employ fewer than 56 (123) employees. In view of 
the size factor, the type of firm under consideration does not usually make 
significant use of equity28, and this is in fact marginal in relation to the 
investment financing operations of the Italian SMEs covered by our study. 
 
4. The determinants of the optimal mix of sources of finance 
As the theoretical literature suggests, the role of self-financing is significant 
in both TOT and POT. 
According to the TOT the firm’s financial investment structure is based on 
the cost-opportunity ratio between internal and external rescources. 
According to the POT firms finance their projects using a combination of 
self-financing, debt and equity, in line with a rise in information 
asymmetries and financing costs (see Fig. 1). 
 
Moreover as suggested in the previous sections there are also banking 
factors like relationship lending and credit market structure that can 
influense the choice of the mix of sources of finance by a firm. 
 
From the empirical point of view, we therefore need to measure the mix of 
sources of finance, in terms first, of the combination of self-financing and 
external resources, in relation to the availability and cost-opportunity ratio 
of internal and external resources and, then, of  the structure of the credit 
market. To achieve this, as already outlined in the previous points, the focus 
of the empirical study was placed on the questions within the questionnaire 
which provide the basis for analysing both the decision to use self-financing 
and the proportion of the financial need generated by the investments made 
which is actually covered by this source of finance. 
The study’s emphasis is thus on the means by which investments are 
financed and not on the firm’s financial structures in the sense of ratio 
between debts and equity , as set out in the Statement of Assets and 
Liabilities29. In other words, we do not study the effects of a new investment 
on the stock of debt and equity in a firm’s financial statement, but rather the 
percentage of use of self-financing (compared to debt and equity) in the 
investment operations carried out during the three-year period investigated. 
 
The descriptive statistics in Tables 3-5 enable us to make several 
preliminary comments with regard to the effects of the firm’s structural and 
financial characteristics on the way in which investments are financed. 
                                                 
28 Even if it were to be used, in view of the small size of the firms, it could be considered as equivalent to 
self-financing since generally the share capital is provided direction by the shareholders, who are 
“informed” about the firm’s risk and profitability characteristics. Thus the empirical results would not 
change if we were to expand our definition of self-financing to include equity. 
29 It should be noted that the financial payables heading has special features which vary depending on 
whether financial statements are presented in full or short form. On this point see, for example, Cenni 
Salotti (2006). 
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Tab. 3 shows that on average self-financing, as either principal (Selffin_B) 
or exclusive (Selffin_C) form of finance, tends to be the favourite choice of 
the youngest firms. With regard to the size variable, self-financing as unique 
form of finance (Selffin_C) tends on average to be more common amongst 
the smallest firms: 29.27% of firms with total assets of less than 5 million 
Euros self-finance 100% of their investments, compared with 26.34% 
(24.81%)  of firms with total assets between 5 and 15 million Euros (over 15 
million Euros). 
Tab. 3 reveals that, on average, firms which decide to finance their 
investments 100% through the use of internal funds have an investment 
ratio, defined as ratio between investments and total assets, lower (mean 
2.81%) than firms which also use other sources of finance (means 3.52% 
and 4.07% respectively). Which means to say that if the investment ratio is 
low – because investments are small in relation to total assets – the firm will 
self-finance 100% of its investments. As the size of the investment to be 
made gradually rises, internal resources are no longer sufficient to cover all 
the expense, and the company is forced to use external sources of finance 
(see Fig. 1)30. The cash flow variable does not “significantly” affect the 
degree of self-financing, since its values are virtually identical for 
Selffin_A, Selffin_B and Selffin_C.  On the other hand, as was to be 
expected, cash flows are higher if the firm has decided to use self-financing 
than in the opposite case. In other words, the availability of cash flows 
signals a capacity for self-financing, and is thus an initial factor of self-
selection for firms. 
Tab. 4  summarises the effects of “internal” and “external rationing” on the 
ways in which investments are financed. As the literature indicates, the 
decision to use self-financing may sometimes be simply the consequence of 
forms of external rationing. In order to better investigate the causes of the 
use of self-financing, we compare the possible inadequacy of internal 
resources to cover investments (internal rationing)31 with the level of 
rationing reported in the questionnaire (external rationing)32. For example, if 
we consider the group where self-financing is the main but not the only 
source of finance (Selffin_B), we find that 54.30% of firms, although 
subject to external rationing and although they had sufficient funds to 
finance 100% of their investments internally, did not choose this option. 
This may indicate that, although the firm had the funds to finance its own 
investments, it preferred not to gamble on the entire project, either partially 
or in full. The failure to provide signalling through self-financing forces the 
bank to apply at least partial rationing33 with the consequence that the 
investment is carried through, but on a smaller scale than in the initial plan. 
                                                 
30 All other conditions being equal, in the transition from D1 to D2 in order to finance the investment 
project the firm is forced to request funds from external sources; otherwise, it is unable to carry out its 
plan. 
31 Internal rationing occurs when a firm is unable to cover its investment requirement rapidly with 
internal funds. The variable used as proxy for this inability is the ratio between the firm’s cash flows in 
the previous period (source AIDA) and the size of the investments reported (see Capitalia). 
32 Questionnaire Section F – Question F1.5: “In 2003, would the firm have liked to have obtained more 
credit at the interest rate agreed with the bank?” (see Capitalia, 2005). 
33 Partial rationing may be explained by the presence/absence of suitable collateral. 
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The other 45.70% of firms rationed by the banks did not use self-financing, 
because their internal resources were insufficient. 
Last but not least, if we concentrate solely on the effects of internal 
rationing on the ways in which investment operations are self-financed (see 
last column, Tab. 4), we find that even with cash flows high enough to 
support the investment operation, firms may decide not to finance their 
projects. This implies, in other words, that firms do not see the use of 
internal sources as top priority, as envisaged by POT. There may be other 
reasons for which a simple cost-benefits analysis using the TOT approach 
may lead firms to prefer external to internal financing, a phenomenon which 
may become particularly significant in periods when interest levels are low, 
for example.  
 
The aim of the following points is to identify, both separately (point 4.1) 
and jointly (point 4.2), the variables which lead on the one hand to the 
“decision”34 as to whether or not to use self-financing, and on the other 
hand the “degree”35 of self-financing within the mix of sources of finance 
once the firm has stated that it does finance its own investments. 
 
4.1 The financing of investments: the multivariate study 
The multivariate analysis which follows aims to estimate the probability of 
self-financing using logit regressions (models 1-3) and to estimate the 
“importance” of self-financing by means of a simple, intuitive OLS estimate 
(models 4-5) (see Tab. 7). 
The Total Assets  variable – used as proxy for the firm’s size- has a positive, 
statistically significant effect in models 1, 2 and 4.  As size increases so 
does the propensity to use self-financing, although not as the only source of 
funds (model 3). In other words, as the firm’s size increase so does its 
ability to finance itself, but the same is true of the other sources of finance. 
This appears to explain why the variable is not significant in model 3. The 
same reason might explain why it is significant with regard to the Selffin_% 
variable – which simply measures the extent of self-financing in percentage 
terms compared to other sources of finance – but loses significance when 
measured with regard to the Self-financing Rate variable, which measures 
the level of coverage of investments by means of self-financing in relation 
to total assets.  In other words, as size increases, the proportion of self-
financing used to cover investments in relation to total assets decreases. 
According to information asymmetry studies, membership of HI-Tech 
sectors requires a certain degree of self-financing, although this is not 
necessarily the only source of funds. In fact, the HI-Tech variable is only 
significant in models 1 and 2 and not in model 3. HI-Tech firms have a 
greater propensity to self-financing in percentage terms compared to the 
other sources of finance (model 4), but not in relative terms in proportion to 
the firm’s total assets (model 5). 
                                                 
34 Dichotomic variables: Selffin_A, Selffin_B and Selffin_C. see Tab. 6. 
35 Degree of self-financing of investments defined as (Amount of investments covered by self-financing * 
Investments in Euros) / Total assets, see Tab.6. 
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The Group variable (a dummy which assumes the value 1 if the firm 
belongs to a group) has a positive effect on self-financing in its various 
forms (models 1-5), but in no case is it statistically significant. The Age of 
firm variable has a positive influence on self-financing in its various forms 
(models 1-5) but is only statistically significant in model 5. 
An increase in Leverage goes hand-in-hand with less use of self-financing: 
this reverse proportionality is statistically significant in all the models. 
Firms which are completely self-financing (model 3) generally have 
adequate financial resources (Current Ratio, Cash Flow and Net Cash 
Flows), and since they do not use external sources or bank debt, they are 
100% self-financing. As was to be expected, the Current Ratio variable 
shows a positive relationship to self-financing.  As Current Ratio increases, 
there is a statistically significant rise in the probability that the firm 
investments will be 100% self-financed. Moreover, Current Ratio has a 
statistically significant influence on the percentage level of self-financing 
compared to the other sources of finance (model 4), but not on the level of 
self-financing as a proportion of the firm’s total assets (model 5). Cash 
flows (i.e. the ratio between cash flows and total assets) have a significant 
negative impact on the tendency to be fully self-financing (model 3). On the 
one hand, this finding supports the TOT hypothesis, by which high cash 
flows make external sources of finance less expensive, but on the other this 
result appears to conflict with the POT, which would lead us to expect a 
positive sign, supporting the chronological preference for internal resources. 
However, this finding is confirmed by the statistically significant positive 
sign of the estimate in model 5. 
The Net Cash Flows variable (a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 
if the cash flows for the previous periods exceed investments) is a more 
effective measurement of the real capability for self-financing investment 
projects, even without recourse to any external finance. In this case the 
exclusive use of internal sources is clearly prevalent, as indicated by the 
positive value of the coefficient estimated for the category variable in the 
models in all 5 models. 
The time priority of internal capital funding, especially in the most intensive 
interpretation given by model 3 and proportionally in model 4, is also 
supported by the presence of accounting parameters linked to the firm’s 
performance during previous years (ROS), the variability in operating profit 
and ROI (SD_RO and SD_ROI)36. 
As expected, the Investment Rate variable, the main variable for the demand 
for finance, has a negative sign in models 2, 3, and 4. 
 
The literature gives relationship lending an important role in the financing 
of SMEs. From an empirical point of view, the variables which best 
approximate the lending relationships between bank and firm are: i) the 
number of banks from which the firm borrows; ii) the proportion of its debt 
provided by main bank; iii) the functional distance between the bank and 
                                                 
36 The variation in operating profit and ROI provide a proxy for firms’ risk levels. In line with the TOT, 
they have a positive impact on the availability of funds for self-financing, since higher risk makes external 
sources of finance more expensive. 
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the firm, and iv) credit rationing. As the number of banking relationships 
(Number of banks) increases and the proportion of debt with the main bank 
(Main bank share) increases, self-financing decreases. These findings are 
statistically significant with regard to the decision to use only self-financing 
to cover investments (model 3) or to make partial use of self-financing 
(models 1-2), as well as for the percentage use of self-financing in relation 
to other sources (model 4), but not with regard to the degree of coverage of 
investments by means of self-financing in relation to total assets (model 5). 
Functional nearness (Local main bank) has a positive effect on self-
financing but is only significant with regard to the decision to use only self-
financing (model 3) and the proportion of self-financing within all sources 
of finance (model 4). With regard to credit rationing, the empirical evidence 
suggests that firms which believe they are suffering from rationing are less 
able to finance themselves. The relationship is always statistically 
significant except in model 3. This suggests an order of preference, in which 
firms which use only self-financing (model 3) are not concerned about 
rationing. This is compatible with the POT (see Fig. 1), under which firms 
prefer to finance all investments with internal resources, and when this is 
not possible, they reduce their level of self-financing (model 1 and 2) and 
apply for external finance, which may be rationable. 
 
In contrast with the suggestions of the theoretical literature on information 
asymmetries, the Information Opacity variable, measured as the ratio 
between tangible and intangible fixed assets, does not seem to produce even 
weakly significant results on the decision to finance investments using 
internal sources (models 1-3), and certainly has no effect on the weight of 
self-financing amongst the sources of finance used (models 4-5). 
The Tangible fixed assets variable, used as proxy for collateral, is only 
statistically significant in models 3 and 5, and even here the signs are 
contradictory. The negative sign of the estimate for model 3 is in line with 
the literature on collateral, which suggests that firms with a high degree of 
tangible fixed assets find it easier to obtain external finance – mainly debt. 
However, this finding is not confirmed by model 5, which would appear to 
suggest the exact opposite. 
 
Last but not least, the variables relating to the structure of the credit market 
do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on the financing 
decision (models 1-3) or on the breakdown of the sources of finance 
(models 4-5), except for the HHI_loans variable, which has a statistically 
significant negative sign with regard to firms’ decision to use 100% self-
financing (model 3). 
 
4.2 The financing of investments: Heckman two-stage analysis 
(preliminary) 
The use of different models in order to attempt to identify the determinants 
of financing decisions (models 1-3) on the one hand, and the breakdown of 
the sources of finance used (models 4 and 5) on the other, produced 
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sometimes conflicting results, making further investigation necessary. The 
analysis provided in this section uses a specification which considers the 
stages of the selection and composition of the mix of sources of finance 
simultaneously, using the well-known sample self-selection model first 
proposed by Heckman (1979)37 (see Tab. 8). Although simple, the model 
suggested provides a significant separation between the stage of (self-
)selection and the stage of the composition of the mix of sources of finance, 
highlighting the need to study this problem using a two-stage method38,39. 
The variables which measure the internal capacity to generate cash flows, 
the capacity of these cash flows to finance the investments internally, the 
presence of rationing and the firm’s financial structure were included in the 
“selection” stage as regressors. All the variables were statistically 
significant and had the expected sign40. The negative sign of rationing on 
self-financing in the selection stage supports a POT hypothesis, in which 
firms with fewer internal funds, i.e. those which use less self-financing, 
come up against problems of bank rationing. During “specification” of 
sources of finance, the firms which have already decided to self-financing 
their investments decide the degree of self-financing to use on the basis of 
the internal resources available, ignoring rationing problems and assigning 
little importance to relationship and information variables, but making use 
of the large number of bank relationships at their disposal and the degree of 
concentration of the credit market. Moreover, amongst the firms which have 
decided to self-financing, the largest show higher rates of self-financing of 
investments, as do those belonging to Hi-Tech sectors. The profitability 
variables (ROS and ROI) have a positive effect on the increase of internal 
capital. When rates of investment are high, firms plan to use a higher 
proportion of internal financial resources to finance their projects. 
Moreover, the amount of self-financing allocated to investments (dependent 
variable of the model) is reversely proportional to the degree of R&D and 
the cash flows net of R&D expenditure. In other words, there is competition 
between these two alternative forms of investment. 
 
                                                 
37 Heckman’s model (1979), which belongs to the general category of selection models, is used in 
corporate finance to discuss self-selection phenomena. Here, it is important not to consider the selection 
aspect as a sampling error requiring correction or elimination, but rather to identify the reasons 
underlying the selection, in terms of unobservable private information, and then represent the 
specification of the parameter to be studied (e.g. degree of self-financing).  The idea is that the degree of 
self-financing is only observable for those who have decided to use this method (first-stage selection). 
The second stage therefore models the percentage of financing, provided self-financing has taken place. 
Heckman’s model is preferable to a Tobit model because the latter uses the same variables during both 
selection and specification. It thus becomes difficult to separate the variables linked to the decision to 
self-financing from the variables which determine the composition of the finance used. 
38 Ex-ante self-selection is also a signalling tool useful for obtaining external funds. On sources of finance 
and signalling, see for example Hellman and Stiglitz, 2000. 
39 From the statistical point of view, the reliability of the joint estimate of the source of finance selection 
stage and the source of finance composition stage when a selection model is used with our data-set is 
confirmed by the significance of the Mills ratio. See Tab. 8. 
40 In other specifications, the presence of bank relationship variables in the selection stage leads to the 
non-significance of the joint estimate. In other words, relationship variables are not as significant as 
rationing. The other specifications have been omitted for reasons of space, but are available from the 
authors on request. 
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5. Conclusions 
The theoretical survey conducted as part of this study reveals that, although 
the financial hierarchy theory suggests that firms prefer self-financing, 
because it is less expensive in economic terms, relationships with local 
banks may offer advantages which encourage firms to enter into debt 
contracts even in the absence of binding internal constraints. Moreover, 
there may also be intermediate solutions in which the firm opts for a mix of 
sources of finance: self-financing, debt and, in some cases, equity. The 
failure of theory to provide definitive results encouraged us to conduct an 
empirical investigation to determine which theoretical model – TOT and/or 
POT – better explains the behaviour of Italian SMEs in their investment 
financing decisions, and which variables explain these decisions and the 
diversification of the sources of finance used.  The empirical study focused 
in particular on the role of self-financing as an alternative to external 
sources.  In order to measure the decision to use self-financing and the 
subsequent composition of the financing mix, we used different techniques, 
first independent models and then a self-selection model. The first results, in 
line with POT, confirm an approach comprising an initial check on the 
availability of internal resources, followed if necessary by the use of 
external capital, including bank debt. The rationing component, which here 
unusually shows a reduction in internal capital, further reinforces the POT 
hypothesis, highlighting that use of bank capital is an option used only when 
insufficient internal funds are available. The decision to use self-financing 
as the first option confirms that firms are affected by information 
asymmetries, implying that external funds are more expensive than internal 
funds. Soft and hard forms of information have no significant effect on the 
mix chosen after the decision to use self-financing. Internal liquidity and 
membership in Hi-Tech sector are positively correlated with the use of 
internal resources. However, in order to reach definitive conclusions, it is 
advisable to investigate how the information components are explicitly 
linked to the rationing decision, and thus whether the rationing itself is 
simply the synthesis of severe information barriers which affect the costs-
benefits of the capital and may thus support the alternative hypothesis of 
TOT. 
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Statistical Appendix 
 
Table 2 – Dimensional characteristics of the companies in the sample 
 
 
Table 3 – Structural characteristics of the firm and self-financing 
Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
no 36 29,5% 906 27,8% 319 33,2 333 29,3 229 21,3
yes 86 70,5% 2357 72,2% 641 66,8 802 70,7 847 78,7
Total 122 100,0% 3263 100,0% 960 100,0 1135 100,0 1076 100,0
no 55 45,1% 1634 50,1% 504 52,5 586 51,6 495 46,0
yes 67 54,9% 1629 49,9% 456 47,5 549 48,4 581 54,0
Total 122 100,0% 3263 100,0% 960 100,0 1135 100,0 1076 100,0
no 86 70,5% 2395 73,4% 679 70,7 836 73,7 809 75,2
yes 36 29,5% 868 26,6% 281 29,3 299 26,3 267 24,8
Total 122 100,0% 3263 100,0% 960 100,0 1135 100,0 1076 100,0
> 3 years
Age Total Assets 2003 (€ x 1000)
>150005000 15000 0-3 years
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Table 4 – Investments, cash flows and self-financing 
Number Perc. M ean Std D ev M edian
no 942 27,8% 3,9% 4,6% 2,5%
yes 2443 72,2% 4,1% 9,3% 2,4%
Total 3385 100,0% 4,0% 8,3% 2,4%
no 1689 49,9% 4,5% 8,2% 2,9%
yes 1696 50,1% 3,5% 8,3% 2,1%
Total 3385 100,0% 4,0% 8,3% 2,4%
no 2481 73,3% 4,5% 7,2% 2,9%
yes 904 26,7% 2,8% 10,6% 1,4%
Total 3385 100,0% 4,0% 8,3% 2,4%
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Investm ent Ratio
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Table 5 – The choice of self-financing: “internal” and “external” rationing 
CF< INV CF> INV CF < INV CF> INV CF < INV CF> INV
no 44,1% 55,9% 30,0% 70,0% 32,7% 67,3%
yes 37,8% 62,2% 21,4% 78,6% 23,5% 76,5%
Total 40,2% 59,8% 23,7% 76,3% 26,0% 74,0%
no 45,7% 54,3% 30,9% 69,1% 33,5% 66,5%
yes 31,3% 68,7% 17,0% 83,0% 18,5% 81,5%
Total 40,2% 59,8% 23,7% 76,3% 26,0% 74,0%
no 42,9% 57,1% 26,6% 73,4% 29,1% 70,9%
yes 30,0% 70,0% 16,0% 84,0% 17,6% 82,4%
Total 40,2% 59,8% 23,7% 76,3% 26,0% 74,0%
Total
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
a
c
ti
vi
ti
es
Rationing
no
Selffin.C
Selffin.A
yes
Selffin.B
 
Note: The cases in which the cash flow for the three-year period (CF) was lower 
than the investments during the period, and the company still declared that it used 
self-financing, are recorded in bold type. The cases in which firms decided not to 
use self-financing even though they had cash flow (CF) in excess of the 
investments are indicated in grey. 
 
Mean Std Dev P 05 P 25 Median P 75 P 95 
Employees (num.) 106 131 13 25 56 123 402 
Total Assets 2003 (x 1000) 29839 158256 1317 3704 8840 18743 105207 
Total Turnover 2003 (x 1000) 29962 131956 1559 4152 9638 20884 100086 
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Table 6 - List and description of dependent and independent variables 
Source Year Observations Missing Mean Std. Dev. Median
SELFFIN_A              Dummy variable; =1 if self-financed investiments  > 0 Capitalia 2003 3385 0 0,722 0,448 1,000
SELFFIN_B              Dummy variable; =1 if self-financed investments > 50% Capitalia 2003 3385 0 0,501 0,500 1,000
SELFFIN_C              Dummy variable; =1 if investiments are fully self-financed Capitalia 2003 3385 0 0,267 0,442 0,000
SELFFIN_% Proportion of investment covered by self-finance        Capitalia 2003 3385 0 0,482 0,410 0,500
SELFFIN_LEV Proportion of investment covered by self-finance x Investments in Euro (x1000) Capitalia 2003 3385 0 1739,460 14340,000 113,097
SELFFIN_RATE Self-finance for investments / Total assets Capitalia and Aida 2001-03 3385 0 0,017 0,059 0,005
AGE Ln of the years in operation of the firm Capitalia 2003 3385 0 3,128 0,737 3,219
TOTAL ASSETS Ln of total assets                         Capitalia 2003 3171 214 9,194 1,304 9,152
HI-TECH If the firm belongs to Hi-Tech sector Capitalia 2003 3385 0 0,048 0,213 0,000
GROUP Dummy variable; =1 if membership of a group Capitalia 2003 3379 6 1,680 0,467 0,000
TURNOVER % variation in turnover 2002-2003 Aida 2002-03 3172 213 8,065 273,094 -0,006
LEVERAGE Debt / Total assets               Aida 2001-03 3134 251 0,715 0,186 0,750
ROS Return on sales             Aida 2001-03 3171 214 1,180 0,555 1,108
ROI ROI - Return on investment                                           Aida 2001-03 3130 255 5,691 6,342 5,040
RO_SD Standard deviation of operating result 1996-2003                                  Aida 1996-03 3158 227 941,956 4729,260 247,946
ROI_SD Standard deviation of ROI 1996-2003 Aida 1996-03 3133 252 3,959 2,664 3,268
CURRENT_RATIO Current assets / Current liabilities Aida 2001-03 3171 214 1,503 1,115 1,234
CASH_FLOW Aida
CASH_FLOW_RATE Cash Flow / Total assets                     Aida 2001-03 3330 55 0,067 0,091 0,058
NET_CASH_FLOW_RATE Dummy variable; =1 if Cash Flow > Investments   Capitalia and Aida 2001-03 3385 0 0,742 0,438 1,000
NET_CASH_FLOW_RD_RATE Dummy variable; =1 if Cash Flow > Expenses in R&D Capitalia and Aida 2001-03 3385 0 0,904 0,295 1,000
INV_RATE Investments / Total assets Capitalia and Aida 2001-03 3385 0 0,040 0,083 0,024
RD_INV_RATE Expenses in R&D/  Total assets Capitalia and Aida 2001-03 3385 0 0,009 0,058 0,000
TANGIBLE Tangible assets / Total assets        Capitalia 2003 3171 214 0,462 0,167 0,466
OPACITY Intangible assets / Tangible assets                    Aida 2001-03 3050 335 0,917 36,681 0,033
NUMBANKS Number of Bank relationships Capitalia 2003 3359 26 5,878 3,555 5,000
MAIN BANK Proprotion of debt with main bank Capitalia 2003 3073 312 31,302 25,274 30,000
LOCAL BANK Dummy variabile; = 1 if local bank has registered office in same province as firm Capitalia 2003 3334 51 1,443 0,497 1,000
RATIONING Dummy variable; =1 if the firm would like more credit                  Capitalia 2003 3340 45 1,858 0,349 0,000
DURATION Age of relationship with main bank                  Capitalia 2003 3225 160 16,877 12,278 15,000
BRANCHES Number of branches by region                 Bank of Italy 2003 3385 0 3128,670 1804,970 3148,000
HHI_LOAN Herfindal index of loans by region Bank of Italy 2003 3385 0 0,073 0,027 0,067
Dependent variables
Explanatory variables
Firm's structural and financial characteristics
Banking market characteristics
Information asymmetries
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Table 7 - Financing of investment activities 
SELFFIN_A SELFFIN_B SELFFIN_C
Firm’s structural and financial characteristics
AGE 0,13070 0,05620 0,02370 0,02147 0,003050 **
TOTAL ASSETS 0,17510
***
0,12740
***
0,03460 0,044350
***
-0,000027
HI-TECH 0,72770
**
0,41150
*
0,27190 0,08421
**
0,000795
GROUP 0,12310 0,16870 0,09230 0,00028 0,002790
TURNOVER 0,23010 0,00007 0,00073 0,00008 0,000006
LEVERAGE -1,90380
***
-1,89700
***
-1,25740
***
-0,28910
***
-0,00995
*
ROS 0,06200 0,186400 ** 0,247300 *** 0,05414 *** 0,002740
ROI 0,01080 0,10500 0,01370 0,00267 0,000288
CURRENT RATIO 0,01750 0,07490 0,13710
**
0,02336
**
-0,000404
CASH_FLOW_RATE 0,97940 -0,63210 -3,94410 ** -0,36379 * 0,196980 ***
NET_CASH_FLOW_INV 0,28110
**
0,50980
***
0,42260
**
0,11761
***
-0,023720
***
NET_CASH_FLOW_RD -0,48140
**
-0,53460
***
-0,40030
*
-0,09437
**
-0,001730
RO_SD 0,00004 0,00008 ** 0,00004 ** 0,00001 * 0,000288
ROI_SD -0,00810 0,00396 0,05260
***
0,00674
**
0,000297
INVESTMENT_RATE 0,88790 -3,05170
**
-8,03100
***
-0,18349
*
Information asymmetries and relationship lending
NUMBANKS -0,04100
**
-0,09980
***
-0,12130
***
-0,01942
***
-0,000287
MAIN BANK -0,00533
**
-0,01020
***
-0,00927
***
-0,00181
***
0,000030
DURATION 0,00654 0,00410 0,00314 0,00059 -0,000060
LOCAL BANK -0,07200 -0,12130 -0,19330
*
-0,04370
***
-0,000911
RATIONING -0,39870
***
-0,32080
**
-0,25410 -0,08597
***
-0,005220
**
OPACITY 0,00084 -0,09680
*
-0,04360 -0,00008 0,000001
TANGIBLE -0,13910 -0,36940 -0,70930
**
-0,01240 0,013600
***
Banking market characteristics
NUM_BRANCHES 0,00001 0,00009
***
0,00005
*
0,00001
***
0,000001
**
LOAN_HHI 0,44890 0,07820 -6,23510
**
0,31075 0,007400
Number of observations 2264 2264 2264 2264 2264
Pseudo R2 0,3262 0,1810 0,4342 0,6280 0,2175
SELFFIN_RATSELFFIN_%
OLSlogit logit logit OLS
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 5model 4
Self-finance                 
> 0
Self-finance
> 50%
Self-finance 
= 100%
 
Note: *** = significant at 0.001; ** = significant at 0.01;* = significant at 
0.05. 
 
Table 8 - Heckman self-selection model 
CASH_FLOW_RATE 1,60896 *** CURRENT RATIO 0,00133 **
NET_CASH_FLOW_INV 0,11692
**
TOTAL ASSETS 0,00281
***
RATIONING -0,45232
***
ROS 0,00302
**
LEVERAGE -0,73529
***
ROI 0,00031
**
NET_CASH_FLOW_RD -0,01648
***
RD_INV_RATE -0,42757 ***
NUM_BANKS -0,00081
***
LOAN_HHI -0,04486
**
LEVERAGE 0,00300
GROUP -0,00129
TANGIBLE -0,00066
OPACITY 0,00000
RATIONING 0,00101
HI-TECH 0,00576
**
DURATION -0,00004
 
Lambda -0,02055 ** Rho -0,66602
N 2740 Sigma 0,03085
Wald Chi2 4107,89 ***
Specification Stage
Two-step self-selection model
      Self-finance > 0
Selection Stage
SELFFIN_A SELFFIN_RATE
 
Note: *** = significant at 0.001; ** = significant at 0.01;* = significant at 
0.05. 
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